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Max talks with Rob Mark about the fatal crash of Cirrus SR22T N17DT near Shelbyville, Indiana, and why this accident is so instructive for any pilot who flies approaches at low altitude with high workload. The NTSB's probable cause centers on inadequate airspeed and an aerodynamic stall, but the real value is in the flight data that shows how the airplane got there: low power held for an extended period, repeated stall warnings, multiple ESP interventions, and flaps that ultimately remained retracted until impact.

This episode matters because it's rare to have this level of detail. The NTSB recovered onboard data that captures dozens of parameters multiple times per second—far more than you usually get from ADS-B alone. Max describes how the NTSB published extensive graphs and also released a spreadsheet of recorded parameters. The spreadsheet didn't include position data, so Max combined it with ADS-B track points and interpolated the missing locations to create a second-by-second reconstruction. The result is a cockpit-style view that shows airspeed, pitch attitude, power, flap position, stall warning activations, and ESP engagement together—so you can see the chain of events, not just the endpoint.

The key factual finding: the engine was operating normally. The "partial engine failure" theories that circulated right after the crash don't hold up against the final report and recorded parameters. Instead, power was pulled back to a very low setting—about 15%, roughly 10–11 inches of manifold pressure—and held there. That's close to a landing-power setting, which means airspeed and energy must be managed carefully to avoid drifting toward stall, especially if configuration changes.

The second key finding is configuration. The flap record shows the flaps briefly at about 50% and then transitioning to 0%. Later, the data shows the flaps again toggling, but ultimately the airplane ends up with flaps retracted and stays that way until the crash. That detail is not cosmetic—stall speed is strongly affected by flap setting. In a low-power approach, retracting flaps increases stall speed and requires a different pitch picture and energy plan. If the airplane is flown as if it has more lift available than it actually does, airspeed can silently bleed away.

As the airplane slowed, the recorded data shows repeated stall warning activations in the final minute, and ESP (Envelope Stability Protection) engaging multiple times. ESP is designed to help discourage pilots from exceeding the envelope by nudging pitch and roll back toward safer values, but it can't create airspeed or altitude. It's a guardrail, not an autopilot that can save a low-altitude slow-speed situation once the margin is gone. In the reconstruction, stall warnings and ESP engagement cluster around the periods when the airplane is slow, pitched up, and operating near the edge of the envelope.

Witness observations align with a low-altitude stall sequence. A driver on a nearby interstate described the airplane as very low, appearing to "hang," then making a sharp turn. The witness observed a wing drop and rapid rocking from one wing vertical to the other before the aircraft disappeared behind trees and a fireball was seen seconds later. The NTSB's recorded data similarly shows the airplane slowing near stall speed followed by a loss of control consistent with a stall at low altitude.

The practical lessons are direct and transferable to any airplane, not just a Cirrus. First, treat any stall warning on approach as a command—not a suggestion. You don't troubleshoot while the airplane is approaching the critical angle of attack. Your first move is to reduce angle of attack (unload) and regain airspeed. Second, make configuration errors harder to commit and easier to catch. Flap position is not a "set it and forget it" item when workload is high. Use callouts, verify indications, and confirm the pitch picture matches the configuration you think you have. Third, recognize that "low-power" plus "slow" plus "turning" is the classic trap. Bank increases stall speed, and when you're low, you don't have the altitude budget to recover from a stall break and wing drop.

Finally, this episode reinforces a mindset: the accident wasn't one bad second; it was a sequence of small choices and small drifts that added up to zero margin. The data shows multiple warning opportunities—stall horn and ESP events—before the final loss of control. The goal for listeners is not to judge the pilots. It's to build habits that make this chain harder to start, easier to detect, and easy to abandon early. When the airplane is telling you it's running out of margin, believe it—then reset the approach while you still have altitude to spare.

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Max talks with Rob Mark about a classic "simple mistake with big consequences" scenario: a pilot who possibly raised the landing gear handle instead of selecting flaps up during the landing roll in a Cirrus Vision Jet. The event looks minor on the surface—no injuries and the airplane stayed on the runway—but it exposes a human-factors trap that can bite any retractable-gear pilot, especially when you're trying to be quick and efficient right after touchdown.

The discussion centers on the NTSB's final report for a Cirrus SF50 Vision Jet that landed at Watsonville Municipal Airport (Watsonville, California) on August 9, 2024. The pilot reported a normal approach and landing. Before touchdown, he had the flaps set to 100% and saw three green landing gear indications. Touchdown itself was uneventful. But during the landing roll—right about when braking began—the nose landing gear collapsed.

Max and Rob walk through what the data showed. On short final, the airplane was properly configured: flaps at 100% and the landing gear down and locked. During rollout, both weight-on-wheels switches were briefly "unloaded," and the landing gear handle was raised and then lowered. That sequence unlocked the nose gear and allowed it to collapse. The main gear also unlocked, but it re-locked before collapsing. The probable cause boiled down to an inadvertent control selection: the pilot likely moved the gear handle instead of selecting the flap switch to 0%.

From there, they unpack why this kind of error is so believable. The flap selector switch sits below the landing gear handle, and many pilots develop a post-touchdown habit of "cleaning up" quickly. Some of that comes from short-field technique: retracting flaps can put more weight on the wheels, increase braking effectiveness, and reduce stopping distance. But the exact moment you're tempted to do it is also the moment you have the least spare attention. You're still fast, directional control still matters, braking is being modulated, and you're managing the transition from flight to rollout. Add fatigue, distraction, or a slightly different cockpit flow than usual, and a wrong-control grab becomes completely plausible.

A big takeaway is that landing isn't over at touchdown. Many pilots subconsciously relax as soon as the mains touch, as if the hard part is done. In reality, the landing roll is when you still have a lot of kinetic energy and limited margin for distraction. Looking down, changing configuration, or reaching for cockpit controls before you're stabilized is how small errors turn into big repair bills. Max and Rob emphasize that "post-landing tasks" are optional until the airplane is clearly under control and slowing.

So what should pilots do differently? Their answer is intentionally boring: slow the flow down. On most runways there is no operational need to rush flap retraction during rollout. Keep your eyes outside, keep the airplane tracking straight, and let speed decay. If you choose to retract flaps on rollout, treat it like a checklist item, not a reflex. Touch the correct control deliberately, verify what you're touching, and use a short verbal callout ("flaps zero") before you move it. Better yet, tie configuration changes to safer triggers—below taxi speed, after exiting the runway, or after stopping and running the after-landing checklist—so you're not doing "extra tasks" while still managing high speed and directional control.

They also discuss building habits that are resistant to error. If your technique is "as soon as I touch down, I do X," you're training your hands to move before your brain has finished verifying the right target. Replace that with a pause that forces confirmation, or a flow that keeps critical controls physically and mentally separated in time. The goal isn't to be fast; it's to be consistent and correct.

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Max talks with Mark Waddell of the Cirrus Owner and Pilots Association (COPA) about how Cirrus pilots can reduce accidents by focusing on the places where the accident chain most often begins: unstable approaches, indecisive go-arounds, and delayed choices during power-loss events. They discuss what pilots are doing in the cockpit that turns routine flights into incidents, and what specific habits and training standards reduce that risk.

Mark explains that 2025 included eight fatal Cirrus accidents and twelve CAPS saves. Mark argues that the big safety wins come from addressing repeatable patterns: how pilots manage energy on final, how quickly they reject a bad approach, and how early they commit to the safest outcome when the engine isn't reliable.

A major theme is decisiveness in abnormal situations, especially anything involving power. Mark walks through how power-loss or engine-roughness events can seduce pilots into flying a normal pattern and hoping things stabilize. That often burns altitude and distance in exchange for false comfort. The operational hazard is simple: the moment a pilot realizes the runway is no longer assured, they're already low, already out of options, and now forced into rushed decisions. Mark emphasizes that when the engine is uncertain, "normal" is the enemy. The airplane doesn't care that the pattern looked tidy; it only cares whether you end up with a survivable outcome.

This ties directly into CAPS decision-making. Mark's message is not "CAPS solves everything," but rather that pilots need an explicit decision framework that prevents them from negotiating with themselves while altitude evaporates. He discusses the idea of a CAPS hard deck—an altitude by which, if a pilot is not certain of a safe landing outcome, they commit to pulling the handle. The point of a hard deck isn't to remove judgment; it's to remove hesitation. If you wait until you're low, you've converted a controlled, survivable deployment into a desperate last-second attempt. In that sense, the hard deck is less about the parachute and more about training the pilot's brain to act early enough for any option to work.

From emergency decisions, the discussion moves to the most universal risk zone: landing and go-around. Mark notes that a large share of reportable events occur during landing or during an attempted go-around. That makes this phase-of-flight a high-leverage target for training, standards, and self-discipline. The trap is that approaches feel "fixable" until they suddenly aren't. Pilots often rationalize small deviations—slightly fast, slightly high, slightly untrimmed—because they believe they can correct it in the last few hundred feet. But each late correction is an energy trade, and those trades frequently end with excessive speed over the threshold, a flat touchdown, a bounce, or a rushed go-around.

They get specific about the "flat landing" pattern. Mark challenges a common cultural habit: equating "smooth" with "good." In many airplanes—and especially in a fast, slick airplane—chasing smoothness can encourage a flatter attitude and higher speed, which increases the chances of touching down on the nose gear or loading it too early. That can lead to nose-gear abuse, shimmy events, prop strikes, and expensive engine tear-downs.

Max reinforces the technique side: trimming matters. If pilots are muscling the airplane through configuration changes and final approach, they're behind the airplane before the flare even begins. A well-trimmed airplane is easier to slow, easier to pitch correctly, and easier to land in the right attitude without forcing it onto the runway.

Go-arounds get treated as a primary skill, not a backup plan. Mark describes why late go-arounds are especially dangerous: if a pilot waits until a bounce or a deep, unstable touchdown attempt, the airplane is close to the ground, slow, and in a configuration that can punish abrupt changes. The go-around itself is not complicated, but it requires coordinated execution: power comes in, right rudder counters yaw, pitch is managed to prevent an excessive nose-up attitude, and configuration changes are timed rather than rushed. A common failure mode is trying to do everything at once—adding power, retracting flaps too aggressively, and pitching up—creating a stall-prone situation at the worst possible altitude.

Mark's guidance pushes pilots toward objective gates: if the approach isn't stable by a defined point, you go around—period. The pilots who get into trouble tend to have elastic standards. They keep moving the goalposts because they want the landing to work. Mark argues that consistency is the cure: standardized stabilized-approach criteria, practiced go-arounds that feel routine, and an acceptance that a go-around is not a failure, it's good judgment.

They also address proficiency and recency, emphasizing that safe performance is less about total hours and more about how frequently a pilot is flying and practicing the right skills. Mark points out that annual hours correlate strongly with landing outcomes; low annual utilization can create a false sense of competence because the pilot has experience, but not recent repetition. The solution isn't heroic flying—it's structured practice: recurring instruction, intentional go-around reps, and consistent standards that prevent "drift" back into sloppy technique.

To make those standards stick, Mark advocates data-driven debriefing. Instead of relying on subjective feel—"that was fine"—pilots can use post-flight tools, such as FlySto and ForeFlight's Cloud Ahoy, to evaluate approach stability, speed control, glidepath consistency, and touchdown energy. The goal isn't chasing a score; it's finding patterns that predict future mistakes. If your data repeatedly shows fast thresholds, unstable vertical paths, or late corrections, you now have something specific to train. Mark's point is blunt: most pilots don't need more aviation wisdom; they need feedback that's objective enough to change behavior.

The episode's bottom line is that Cirrus safety is not about secret techniques. It's about earlier decisions, tighter standards, and repeated practice in the phases of flight where accidents are born. Nail stabilized approaches, normalize early go-arounds, commit sooner in power-loss scenarios, and use honest debriefing to identify risk trends before they turn into an NTSB report.

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Max talks with host Scott Hamilton of WBT, Charlotte's News Talk radio, about the Statesville, North Carolina Citation 550 crash that killed NASCAR driver Greg Biffle and six others, then expands the conversation with a fresh technical finding and a practical training takeaway for pilots. While preparing for the short radio interview, Max revisited the ADS-B track and noticed something he hadn't seen anyone else write about: the altitude anomaly isn't merely a "jump," it's an impossible spike.

The key number is stark. The ADS-B data shows a reported climb of 1,374 feet in 1.64 seconds, which implies a climb rate of almost 50,000 feet per minute—a rate that doesn't make sense for a Citation.

Max's point is that this isn't a real aircraft maneuver; it's a data or sensor-path artifact. What makes it more compelling is what happens immediately beforehand: for 34 seconds, there were 14 ADS-B transmissions in a row with the exact same reported altitude.

That kind of perfectly flat series is abnormal even if an aircraft is "steady," because pressure altitude reporting typically wiggles at least a little from sample to sample.

Max lays out a simple, pilot-intuitive interpretation: the aircraft was likely climbing normally, but the altitude value feeding ADS-B froze for about 34 seconds and then unfroze, "catching up" in one big correction.

If you treat that 1,374-foot change as occurring across the 34-second freeze rather than across 1.64 seconds, you get a climb rate around 2,200 fpm—entirely plausible for a departing Citation.

About 20 seconds after the correction, the aircraft turned back toward the airport.

Max also notes there is audio where a pilot announces on CTAF they are returning because they were "having issues," and he believes those "issues" were likely altimeter/altitude-related rather than a direct cause of the crash.

From there, he turns the discussion into something useful for any pilot: how altitude gets measured, encoded, and transmitted—and what kinds of failures can create misleading outputs. In the Citation 550, there are multiple static ports feeding pilot-side and copilot-side instruments, plus potentially additional static sources feeding backups.

Depending on the configuration, ADS-B altitude can be sourced through a blind encoder tied to the static system, an air data computer, or an encoding ("coding") altimeter common in older round-gauge aircraft.

The operational point: pilots might see one thing on their instruments while the transmitted pressure altitude shows something else—or the opposite—depending on where the fault lives.

Max then shifts to the accident sequence on return. Regardless of what prompted the turnback, he argues the crash itself likely occurred on short final for a different reason: visual illusions in rain and degraded visibility.

The aircraft struck the approach lighting system short of the runway threshold, which is exactly the kind of outcome that can happen when pilots subtly, unknowingly fly a shallow or low path while "going visual."

He emphasizes that we don't yet know the cause with certainty, but absent evidence of an engine failure on short final, illusions are a credible explanatory bucket—and one pilots can learn from immediately.

The primary illusion he highlights is water refraction. Rain on the windshield can make the horizon appear lower than it is, which creates the sensation of being higher than you really are—leading to an unconscious nose-down correction and a lower-than-intended glidepath.

He also cites guidance that rain, mist, and limited slant visibility reduce and distort visual cues during the instrument-to-visual transition, exactly when pilots are most vulnerable to subtle errors.

These effects are also documented in Flight Safety Foundation's ALAR "Visual Illusions" briefing note, which specifically calls out rain-on-windshield refraction and the way rain can change the apparent intensity/brilliance of approach lighting.

Max closes with a concrete "do this next time" list. First, if you accept a visual in marginal conditions, load the ILS and use it to back up the visual—it would have shown a low path before contact with approach lights.

Second, he discusses a tech-forward defense: using Garmin visual approaches (the NTSB recovered a Garmin GTN 750 from the wreckage) and tools like Pathways in synthetic vision to help maintain a stable vertical picture.

But he adds a blunt warning that pilots routinely get wrong: Garmin visual approaches do not guarantee terrain clearance, and in hilly terrain or limited visibility they can route you into terrain unless you've validated them in good conditions.

The takeaway is simple: when your eyes can lie, disciplined cross-checking—and knowing the limitations of your tools—is what keeps you off the lights and on a safe path to the runway.

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Max talks with Dr. Catherine Cavagnaro about how aerobatic training builds safer, more confident pilots by reducing loss of control, improving stall and spin awareness, and shortening the startle response. Although many pilots associate aerobatics with airshows or extreme flying, this conversation reframes aerobatic training as a practical safety tool that directly applies to everyday general aviation operations.

Catherine explains that the core value of aerobatic training lies in learning where "the edge" of aircraft control really is. Many pilots are taught to avoid stalls and spins at all costs, which can unintentionally create fear rather than understanding. Aerobatic training deliberately takes pilots past that edge in a controlled environment so they can see, feel, and understand what happens beyond it. Once pilots truly understand where that boundary lies, they are far better equipped to avoid unintentionally crossing it during normal flight.

A major theme of the discussion is loss of control, which remains one of the leading causes of fatal aviation accidents. Catherine describes how many loss-of-control events are not caused by a lack of knowledge, but by startle response and improper control inputs under stress. When something unexpected happens—such as an uncommanded roll, a botched go-around, or a developing stall—pilots often freeze for several seconds or react instinctively in exactly the wrong way. Aerobatic and upset-recovery training helps shorten those "extended dumb moments" by making unusual attitudes familiar rather than frightening.

Catherine shares real-world examples from her experience as a Designated Pilot Examiner. In one case, a commercial pilot applicant mishandled a power-off stall by applying aileron instead of reducing angle of attack, which aggressively drove the aircraft into a spin. The pilot then added power while still stalled, compounding the problem. Catherine explains that this reaction mirrors what has been seen in fatal airline accidents, where pilots pulled back and applied aileron during stall events instead of pushing forward. These moments highlight why understanding stalls, spins, and proper recovery techniques is essential well beyond the private pilot level.

A key technical takeaway from the episode is the importance of angle of attack. Catherine emphasizes that losing directional control is a clear sign of an impending stall, and that rudder alone is often insufficient to stop a departure once it begins. Simply pushing forward on the controls—reducing angle of attack—can immediately end the event. Aerobatic training reinforces this lesson repeatedly, helping pilots build instinctive, correct responses rather than relying on rote memorization.

The conversation also explores how control authority changes with airspeed. Catherine explains that pilots tend to be overly gentle on the controls when flying slowly, particularly near the ground during takeoff and landing. Ironically, that is precisely when larger, more deliberate control inputs are required. Aerobatic maneuvers such as loops, rolls, and Immelmann turns vividly demonstrate how sluggish controls become at low airspeeds and high angles of attack, making these lessons stick in a way that textbooks cannot.

Max and Catherine discuss how aerobatic training is structured at her school. Rather than offering single "thrill ride" flights, Catherine teaches aerobatics as a multi-day course that includes extensive ground instruction before every flight. This ensures pilots understand exactly what will happen before experiencing it in the air. The goal is not to impress or intimidate, but to build confidence, predictability, and mastery. Students perform most of the flying themselves, which further reinforces learning and reduces anxiety.

Another practical aspect of the episode focuses on managing motion sickness. Catherine shares wisdom passed down from aerobatic legend Bill Kershner, including the stages of nausea—Normal, Not So Much Fun Anymore, Sweat on Upper Lip, and the point of no return. Recognizing these stages early allows instructors to intervene before discomfort escalates. Simple strategies such as eating light meals beforehand, keeping airflow on the face, tensing abdominal muscles during high-G maneuvers, and ensuring students have their hands on the controls can make a significant difference.

The discussion also touches on upset-recovery checklists used in airline training, such as "Push, Roll, Power, Stabilize." Catherine notes that while these checklists are effective, pilots must practice the full sequence under stress. Knowing only the first step—pushing forward—without following through can leave an aircraft in an equally dangerous situation. Aerobatic training provides the repetition needed to execute these steps smoothly and correctly when it matters most.

Ultimately, the episode makes a compelling case that aerobatic training is not about becoming an aerobatic pilot. It is about becoming a better, safer pilot in any airplane. By replacing fear of stalls and spins with understanding and respect, aerobatic training equips pilots with a deeper mental and physical toolkit. Whether flying a simple trainer or a high-performance aircraft, pilots who understand the edge—and have practiced operating near it—are better prepared to keep themselves and their passengers safe.

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Mentioned on the Show
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